

9-8381/a

DEC 24 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR : The Deputy Under Secretary of State  
SUBJECT : Disposition of U.S. Copies of Captured  
German Records

1. This will acknowledge and thank you for your memorandum of 2 November 1957 on the above subject.

2. We are arranging to give priority to the completion of the counterintelligence screening of the contents of 500 containers now pending release to the public domain. Of this number, about one-fifth, which from the data sheets provided by the Department appeared to be of counterintelligence interest, were completed in August 1957. The remainder must be scrutinized frame-for-frame. I can assure you that this task will be accomplished on an accelerated basis, as expeditiously as possible.

3. Specific items of intelligence and counterintelligence import affecting responsibilities of IAC components under NSCID 12 will be brought to your attention as rapidly as it is feasible to do so. Intelligence and counterintelligence data screened from these materials must undergo a varying degree of specialized examination by personnel familiar with the operations of particular intelligence services and areas, and, as well, must be cross-checked against our files. I will leave it to those charged with the responsibility of screening to work out with those in the State Department concerned, the forms and methods appropriate to an expeditious and mutually satisfactory notification to the Department of those materials we regard of sensitive counterintelligence importance. An enumeration by frames of items of counterintelligence sensitivity in the containers thus far examined which are now pending release to the public domain will be provided to the Department during the coming month.

4. In this regard I am concerned with a possibility which is suggested by the analysis which is attached to your memorandum; namely, that a discussion will ensue regarding the merits of each indication that is made by this Agency that particular items of intelligence and counterintelligence importance should not at this

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time be placed in the public domain. I desire of course to forestall this result. The criteria of what constitutes documents of a sensitive counterintelligence nature are not defined by those charged with the current CI screening program so as to include the generality of political intelligence reports. The criteria are as follows:

a. A priority importance is given to documents which identify Soviet Intelligence personalities, agents or contacts and which are concerned with Soviet Intelligence operations, this includes clandestine activity of communist parties and communist party personnel.

b. Secondarily, we are concerned with identification of German intelligence personnel, German intelligence agents and German operations; in particular, German penetrations of Soviet operations and the operations of other national intelligence services or agencies, including the United States. And finally, we are concerned with the identification of intelligence personnel and operations of all other nations.

I can assure you therefore that the Agency's specification of materials of counterintelligence interest and attendant recommendation that such materials not be released to the public domain will reflect, in every instance, studied consideration.

5. The frames cited in paragraph 5 of my memorandum of 24 July 1957 are specific illustrations of the kind of material I have described above. I agree with your observation that such documents are relatively few in number. I must underline the fact that this Agency's concern is with frames rather than whole reels. I am certain that it will be possible for the Department to find the proper formula in carrying out custodial responsibilities under NSCID 12 as far as these items are concerned, in a way which will be consistent with the broad requirements of historians for access to the bulk of the material.

6. You mention in your memorandum that these captured German Foreign Office documents were extensively exploited for United States intelligence purposes in the years immediately following the war. While this statement may be technically accurate, it does not in my opinion represent a complete statement of the problem. What exploitation was made of these materials after the war was never directed to United States counterintelligence purposes and except in the limited context of the Nuremberg proceedings these materials have not been

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accessioned to the records and indices maintained by the members of the intelligence community charged with counterintelligence responsibilities. I have proposed that the Agency undertake this task in the common concern. That this was not undertaken eleven years ago does not vitiate, in my opinion, the necessity to carry it out at the present time. In 1945, as you know, intelligence and counterintelligence targets were far different from what they are today.

7. I have asked those carrying out the document screening task for this Agency to keep in close touch with appropriate officials in the Department of State and to finish the task as rapidly as possible.

Signed

C. P. CARELL  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Deputy Director

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